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I.     INTRODUCTION 
In June of 195^ the United States of America  was prospering 
under the leadership of President Dwight D.   Eisenhower.    Korea was 
no longer in the headlines and Senator McCarthy was busy with his 
purge of high government officials of communist leanings.    Only 
minor problems in Latin America bothered the State Department until 
tiny Guatemala hit the headlines,   sharing  the front page of the New 
York Times with Senator McCarthy.     The Security Council of the 
United Nations  was called to  session,   the Peace Commission of the 
Organization of American States met,  and the State Department found 
itself confronted with a major problem.    Across  the  world,  Uncle 
Sam was burned in effigy and riots protested alleged United States 
actions. 
What had happened?    A group of Guatemalan rebels,  led by 
Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas,   had crossed the border between 
Honduras and Guatemala and begun a revolution against the  existing 
Guatemalan government of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. 
Why did a rebellion in Guatemala become world news?     Because 
both the United States and Russia were indirectly or directly in- 
volved in this  tiny country,  one of the  "Banana Republics".    This 
rebellion was the first confrontation in Latin America of these two 
great powers.     As such,  the event was a  significant moment in the 
history of Latin America and in the development of the Cold War. 
, 
The importance of the 195* change of government in Guatemala was 
recognized at the time for the next years saw a voluminous amount 
of literature appear on the subject. Many supporters of Colonel 
Arbenz wrote angry reports of United States intervention bringing 
failure to the social revolution in Guatemala. On the other hand 
many reports appeared of Colonel Castillo saving his country from 
communism,   with or  without help from the United States. 
Our nurpose is not to  declare one view right and the other 
wrong but to learn from both in our attempt to  understand the    ian who 
rose to power,   power which brought him to  exile in 195*4-*     Colonel 
Jacobo Arbenz Guzman faced problems and issues in juatemala which led 
to  his final confrontation—with defeat. 
Let us be^in at the beginning. 
XX.     BACKGROUND 
A.    Country 
Guatemala is a beautiful if small country located on the 
isthmus between North and South America.    Though her size is only 
42,000 square miles  she is  the largest country of Central America. 
Sharing her northern border with Mexico, to the southeast she faces 
Honduras and EL Salvador.     She has very little Caribbean coastline 
for,  to the east,   British Honduras is her neighbor.  (Official maps 
of Guatemala  show this as Belize,  a part of Guatemala.     The crown 
colony is a constant source of irritation in Anglo-Guatemalan 
diplomatic  relations.) 
Topographically and climatically Guatemala  is a land of 
variety.     From her tierra caliente to  her high mountains she offers 
almost any kind of climate one could desire.     The ancient Mayas 
chose the densely forested Peten for their civilization  which de- 
clined before the arrival of the Spaniards in the loth century. 
Their descendants chose the high intermontane basins to  cultivate 
maize,  dietary staple of the isolated Mayan communities.     The 
Spaniards arriving in Guatemala  found no riches to lure them into 
the Indian  world and so  chose the tierra templada for their huge 
^■Frora:    Preston Everett James,  Latin America  (3d.   ed.; 
New lork:    Odyssey Press,  1959);  and Franklin D.   Parker,  The 
Central American Republics  (London:    Oxford University Press,  1964). 
estates.     It was not until the twentieth century that the hot low- 
lands  were occupied—by North Americans  who  set up commercial planta- 
tions of bananas to jive Guatemala her name as a  "Banana Republic". 
Guatemala,   though called by this name,   does not export 
bananas as her major cash crop.    Guatemala is almost totally depend- 
ent on the foreign market for coffee which comprises 70-80y of her 
exports.     Bananas account for another 10$;  rarely have  they consti- 
tuted over 20' of Guatemala's  exports.     Chicle and wood products from 
the Peten are only a  small part of her yearly  exports. 
Since pre-colonial  times Guatemala has had an agricultural 
economy.    The 2-layas lived as they still  do  today:     by obtaining a 
meagre existence from the soil using primitive methods of maize 
cultivation.    The Spaniards set up huge  estates—haciendas—and used 
them for grazing and cash crops.     Until the invention of chemical 
dyes in the 19th century indigo and cochineal were exported from 
Guatemala.     Only products  such as these could bring a profit with the 
high cost of transportation.    German immigrants set up their haciendas 
and produced coffee when the demand in Europe grew at the end of the 
19th century.     Spaniards took up the boom and coffee became the major 
export of Guatemala. 
In 1906 the United Fruit Company began production of bananas 
in Guatemala but the great depression set the industry back.     Since 
then they have been the second major export of Guatemala,   though a 
poor  second to coffee. 
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B.     The People 
Traditionally Mayan,  Guatemala  today remains a predominantly 
Indian country.     Of her  3.5 million people,  over  50$ are pure Mayas; 
slightly fewer are called ladings,  and not over 1 or 2? are pure 
European descent. 
The Mayas remain  isolated in their intermontane basins and 
play little part in the political life of Guatemala.     They barely 
exist in these basins because they are too crowded and the soil is 
often too   exhausted to produce adequate food for all.    The close- 
knit Indian  societies work  their lands,   which are owned communally, 
and have little contact with the outside  world.     The basins are 
often inaccessible except by foot or mule and many Indians are born, 
live and die in  their one little village.     Since Vferld "«fer I slow 
changes have occurred in these high (S.OOO'-ll.OOO1) mountains. 
Indians have been  forced to look for income elsewhere.     They have 
gone to the plantations  for seasonal work  (at extremely low wages) 
but most of them then return to  their communities.     They have little 
concern for or knowledge of political developments  in the country. 
In spite of their  isolation the Mayas are an important factor in  the 
economic life of Guatemala.    As  seasonal farm hands they are slow 
and inefficient.     In agriculture,   subsistence farming takes up more 
acreage for maize  than all commercial export crops.    The inefficiency 
is apparent in  statistics:    80$ of Guatemala's people are engaged in 
2From:    Nathan L.   gotten,  Guatemala:    the Land and the People 
(New Haven:    Yale University Press,  19ol). 
farming 10$ of her land,    Guatemala cannot ignore  the Mayas in order 
to  develop a  stable economy. 
The second largest group of juatemala's people is called 
ladino.     Of this group,  many are of pure Indian blood and many are 
of mixed descent.     The term includes all Indians and mestizoes  who have 
adopted the  ways of the conquering  Spaniard.     They have left their 
traditional  community,   ways of dressing,  and habits of the past to 
live in towns or on farms as laborers.     The ladinos become the peasants 
of the Spanish society.     In more recent times a few ladinos have be- 
come a  small middle class of which the  "upper"  echelons are the German 
immigrants and their descendants.     Though the ladinos are a more 
direct part of national life than the  Indians they have had little to 
say in governing the country.     They have been separated from the 
ruling class by a wide gap. 
The Spanish aristocracy has been very systematic  in maintain- 
ing its position of power since colonial times.     The Indians have 
been left to  their isolated communities,  and debt peonage has kept 
the ladino in his position of inferiority.    There has been a  succession 
of dictators in Guatemala who have successfully guarded the power of 
the Spanish aristocracy.     One dictator  was ousted by another but the 
Spaniards maintained their group as the rulers of the land.     As such 
they owned vast haciendas which were run by hired help in order to 
maintain the town life of the aristocrats.    Guatemala City,  built 
after the former capital Antigua was destroyed by an earthquake,   is 
the center of culture,  power,  and aristocracy of the country.    Situa- 
ted in a  5,000'  high basin its climate is the ideal choice for 
. 
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descendants of the colonial lords.     From Guatemala City the Spanish 
aristocracy still rules the land with few changes in the traditional 
style of dictatorship.     North Americans completed the railways across 
the country and a few roads have been built since the 1930's to  help 
bring Guatemala  into the modern world.     However,   she has a long  road 
ahead of her before the traditional ways of Spaniards and Indians 
disappear. 
c-    The History3 
The Mayan civilization had disappeared from the Peten area 
long before the first Spaniards arrived in Juatemala.     The first 
group under Pedro  de Alvarado arrived in 152*1 and found Mayan descend- 
ants in the high intermontane basin.     They found few minerals but the 
rich soils of the  country impelled them to  settle and become gentle- 
man farmers relying on Indian labor.     The population of Guatemala 
grew slowly but her capital became the center of the Captaincy General 
of Guatemala,   encompassing all of Central America. 
The colonial period ended  when the Spanish descendants pro- 
claimed their independence in 1821.    Mexico  was fighting for her 
freedom from Spain at this time and little attention was paid to  the 
newly independent Captaincy General to  the South.     Mexico  tried to 
reclaim the territory after she had secured her independence but the 
union failed.     In 1823 the United Provinces of Central America  was 
born under the leadership of Guatemala but by 1838 five separate 
3From:    Hubert Clinton Herring, A History of Latin America (2d. 
ed.;  New York:  Knopf, 196l)s   and Parker,   The Central American 
Republics. 
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countries  were  in existence.     All later attempts at reunion failed 
and Guatemala  thus became a republic on her own after 1838. 
Guatemala as a  separate country  was delivered into the hands 
of a  dictator at her birth.     An illiterate conservative,  Rafael 
Carrara maintained order and thus the  support of the aristocracy 
until his death in 1865.     This time the liberals took over with a 
dictator of their own,   Justo Rufino Barrios. 
Where Carrera was a  strong  supporter of the Catholic  Church 
Barrios was  extremely anticlerical.     In  spite of this he is the most 
exalted 19th century ruler of Guatemala.     He restored the finances of 
the government which Carrera had destroyed and he  encouraged diversi- 
fication of crops and immigration.    As an esteemed leader he decided 
to  reestablish the unity of Central America and was killed in his 
first battle to make it effective.     His dream died with him but the 
Liberals maintained control until 1898 and the dictatorship of Manuel 
Estrada Cabrera. 
From the  era of Barrios Guatemala now turned the clock back to 
tyranny and a government of thieves and bandits.     The rule of Estrada 
Cabrera lasted for 22 years and there is little jood to be said about 
it.     Professing  to be a  true advocate of education he built few 
schools to   support his  statements.     In  spite of the horrors of his 
rule  Estrada  Cabrera was kept in power by an efficient secret police. 
He was finally ousted and Guatemala  spent ten years in turmoil in an 
attempt to  establish a democracy.     The effort failed and the 1920's 
ended in disillusionment as the last dictator came to  power. 
Jorge Ubico ruled his country strictly  for 14 years.    He com- 
pleted many public  works through the use of forced Indian labor: 
roads,  hospitals,   etc.     Professing  friendship for the Indians he 
nevertheless  did little  to integrate them in the life of the nation. 
He ruled efficiently but the days of a lon>lived dictatorship were 
numbered in Guatemala.     Young intellectuals were excited by events 
in Mexico and Russia since the 1910' s and were anxious to  take these 
new ideas to  their homeland.     In 19^4 the young Guatemalans attempted 
just that:     for 10 years the country was in the throes of social 
revolution.     The curtain fell in 195^ but the ten years could not be 
erased from her history. 
III.     THE DRAMA OF THE REVOLUTION 
The end of Ubico's rule marked the beginning of the social 
revolution in Guatemala.     In June,  19^t  Ubico  succumbed to  the 
pressure of the people and Federico  Ponce Vaides became the head of 
a triumvirate charged with writing a new Constitution.     Ponce,  like 
Ubico,   had dictatorial tendencies but his government was short lived: 
he was forced to resign in October, 19^. 
The new triumvirate was formed by Colonel  Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, 
Jorge Toriello  Garrido,  and Francisco  Javier Arana.     These three men, 
two military and one civilian,   wrote the Constitution of 19^,  grant- 
in ■  to all Guatemalans rights  denied by dictatorship.     For the first 
time the Constitution supported the right of workers to organize—a 
right promptly taken by the laborers. 
With the promulgation of the new Constitution,   a Congress and 
a new President took office after being  duly elected by the  people. 
President Juan Jose Arevalo was sworn into office on the 15th of 
March,  19^5.     The new President had the  support of a large segment of 
the population;  he  was called to campaign for the office from his 
professorship at the University of La Plata  in Argentina.    A civilian, 
an educator,  and a reformer. Arevalo campaigned vigorously for the 
office to  which he was  elected. 
WLth the installation of the new President exiles  from Ubico's 
rule flocked back  to Guatemala.    Many had been in Mexico  where 
. 
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socialism was  the object of study of the intellectuals.    These 
juatemalans,  aided by a group of leaders from other Latin American 
countries,   returned to  their homeland to organize labor and political 
groups.     Their tendency toward socialism included communism,   and the 
Communist Party of Guatemala was born during Arevalo's Presidency. 
Communist affiliation and control of labor  syndicates also became a 
fact during  these years.     The Marxist school,   Escuela Claridad,   was 
opened only to  be closed by Arevalo  in 19^.    Another attempt was made 
to open a Marxist school but Arevalo's Minister of Government ordered 
it to be closed in 19^9. 
Besides  these feeble attempts to limit communist growth Arevalo's 
term produced significant legislation and set the stage for the 
Presidency of Arbenz.     Though the workers had the right to organize 
granted in the Constitution,  remaining  for the President was the task 
of writing a Code of Labor.    Arevalo  was proud of this achievement as 
he established the Labor Code as the law of the land in May,  19^+7. 
Not only were workers granted the right to organize,  but they now had 
the Government behind them,  limiting  the powers of the once establish- 
ed oligarchy.    Arevalo was aware of the imperfections of the law but 
he firmly believed in it as a great step forward in the evolution of 
"spiritual socialism".'1 The President,  however,   failed to assess 
its greatest weakness  which became apparent soon after Arbenz  took 
power.     The major fallacy of the Labor Code characterizes the entire 
4 Juan Jose Arevalo,   "Al entregar al pueblo  el Codigo  de 
Trabajo",  in Escritos politicos v. discursos  (Havana,  1953J.   pp. 
389-96. 
t 
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Presidency of Arevalo:     the total  freedom granted to  the labor move- 
ment and to the nation fostered the development of communist leader- 
ship and power. 
Arevalo  was a teacher and philosopher by nature and experience. 
Possessor of a decree from an Argentina  University,   Doctor of 
Philosophy in Education,  Juan Jose Arevalo could attract the people 
but could not fulfill the role of President.     At 42  his  "spiritual 
socialism"  seemed attractive but idealistic—the  Communist group 
were the practical people who  took advantage of the situation.    Arevalo 
tried to  remain above politics and to  establish an ideal democracy in 
his  small nation.     He could not see that traditions of over two 
centuries are not easily forgotten.     Since the time of the conquest 
Guatemala had obeyed her leaders:     the conquistadores,  the church, 
the dictators.     Arevalo realized his people had been servile yet 
believed that democracy would burst into full bloom overnight in the 
fertile soil of his homeland.     From 19^5 to 1951  Juan Jose' Arevalo 
led his nation into a new era  in which democracy could flourish,  but 
side by side with communism. 
By 19^+9 the elections were taking shape for December, 1950. 
Colonel Arana and Colonel Arbenz were the major contenders for the 
highest office in the land.     But Arana did not live to keep the 
electorate.    Quite popular with the people he posed a serious threat 
to the election of Arbenz until he was sent in search of clandestine 
arms on July 18, 19^9.    On the return trip he was ambushed and 
assassinated. Thou rh the general belief indicates it was the work 
^Carlos Samayoa Chinchilla,  El Quetzal no  es rpjo  (Guatemala, 
1956),  p.  126. 
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of Arbenz'  loyal men nothing has been proved about the mysterious 
death of Colonel Arana.    Ar6valo refused to  investigate  the case as 
did his successor,   Jacobo Arbenz. 
The new President took office in 19515  Guatemala was prepared 
to continue her march toward a new day of democratic government. 
Labor unions were organized,  coffee prices  were higher than ever 
before,  many political parties were registered (though the communist 
was not),  and Arbenz  had been chosen to lead the country forward. 
In a little more than 3 years, Arbenz had led the country to a point 
of no return.     The only alternative  was rebellion and Colonel Castillo 
Armas led the  forces to end the  era of social revolution. 
Jacobo Arbenz became President by a large majority.    He made 
repeated attempts  to maintain this unity and thus communists  were 
able to  take many key positions of power.     Arbenz  refused to limit 
them in any way because he claimed them for his most loyal supporters. 
Indeed they were and their rewards  were handsome.     Arbenz had 
campaigned on the promise of agrarian reform (which Arevalo had not 
carried out) and in May, 1952,   the Agrarian Reform bill was railroaded 
through Congress to become law in a matter of hours.     It stated that 
unused lands of haciendas could be expropriated with indemnization to 
be paid in long-term agrarian bonds.    The control of appeals  was 
placed in the hands of the President,  by-passing  the Supreme Court of 
Guatemala.     The National Agrarian Department was  established to handle 
land redistribution.6    Though not solely responsible for the act the 
Whetten,  Guatemala,  p.  lj£• 
1* 
Communist Party claimed to be the true friend of the peasant with 
agrarian reform as proof of this friendship.    However,  the agrarian 
reform links  to communism finally brought the Presidency of Arbenz 
to an end. 
The first hacendados affected by expropriation  took their 
case to  the Supreme Court,   which voted in  favor of the landowners. 
Arbenz  removed these judges and thus ended all appeals for  the rights 
of landowners.     Peasants were encouraged to denounce  "unused" lands 
and agrarian  reform became a political tool to   ,ain peasant support, 
ceasing  to be an economic move.    As violence grew to be the common 
law of the land in rural areas the statistics on agrarian reform grew 
confused.    And by the end of 1953 the government of Arbenz  was 
beginning  to   fear rebellion,   especially under the leadership of 
Colonel  Carlos Castillo Armas. 
In 1950 Castillo had tried to overthrow Arevalo  from the mili- 
tary base Aurora.     He failed and was imprisoned,     but made a daring 
escape to  Colombia  the following  year.     As Communist power grew the 
anti-communist groups within the country gradually died out as their 
members became exiles.    On April fc, 1953. Guatemala left the Organ- 
ization of Central American States (ODECA) accusing her neighbors 
of trying to  intervene in her affairs.8     Colonel  Castillo had set up 
quarters  in Honduras.     The next step was  to  sound a note of discord 
at the meeting in Caracas of the Organization of American States. 
7Samayoa,  EL Zuetzal no  es rojo,  p.  3*3. 
o 
See Appendix. 
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The United States presented a resolution  which established 
international communism as intervention and a threat to the peace of 
Q 
the Americas,   subject to action according  to the Rio  Treaty of 19*+9. 
juateraala claimed this  step was a front to call for intervention in 
her program of agrarian reform in order to protect the interests of 
the United Fruit Company.    She also opposed a resolution presented by 
Panama  to  ease racial  tensions in the Americas.     Guatemala based her 
opposition on  the fact that communism  was connected to racial tension. 
By March,  195^,  Guatemala had become a champion of "democracy"—and 
communism in the Americas. 
But while Guatemala was proclaiming  her beliefs there were things 
happening back at home.     By January,  195^.   terror ruled rural Guate- 
mala.     The United States was becoming more aware of the small nation: 
on January 15,   Senator Wiley of Wisconsin announced that Guatemala had 
direct ties to Moscow.10    At this time Guillermo Toriello became Foreign 
Minister of Guatemala.     Arbenz  was becoming  insecure early in 195^ for 
political arrests came more frequently:    on January 26 a round of 
arrests was made at the discovery of a subversive net.    Those arrested 
were radio announcers of stations which had not yet come under Govern- 
ment control.     Journalists felt the pressure enough to protest their 
right to  freedom of the  press. 
9The Rio Treaty of 19^9 established a  defense system for the 
hemisphere.     'With the Cold War threatening  peace the American  states 
adopted this treaty  to  insure a united hemisphere against an outside 
attacker. 
10The New York Times.  January 15. 195^ 
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As agrarian reform was becoming uncontrolled and the government 
was regularly discovering plots to overthrow Arbenz,  labor unions were 
adding to  the confusion by strikes of one large group or another 
occurring  constantly.     Chaos and terror  were  working hand in hand to 
bring a  climax to  the situation.    In April 195^ the Archbishop of 
juatemala  spoke out against the close connections of Arbenz  with 
communism.     A Catholic country,  Guatemala listened to his words but 
found little that could be done.    The battle of nerves was reaching 
the breaking  point and on April 28 five children were arrested for 
writing   "32" on the walls.11    This referred to Article 32 of the 
Constitution of Guatemala which forbade the organization of inter- 
national political groups in Guatemala.     Clandestine radios were taking 
an active role in this war of nerves,  urging  the people to prepare to 
join  the revolutionaries. 
The beginning of the end came May 17. 195^ when the Alfhelm 
landed in Guatemala with an arms shipment from Poland.     This helped 
unite the Americas in a desire to act,  but nothing happened immediate- 
ly except that the United States increased her  sale of arms to 
Nicaragua and Honduras to help balance the military power of Central 
America. 
The situation In Guatemala became  extremely tense as the exiles 
began dropping  pamphlets in the cities.     Arbenz prepared to  weather 
the  storm and tried to  settle the United Fruit Company expropriations, 
the basis for United States-Guatemalan  disagreement.     The United States 
1:LIbid..  April 28,  195^- 
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claimed that the issue  was communism but Arbenz flatly denied this 
accusation.    On June 8 Arbenz  suspended civil liberties and a meet- 
ing of American foreign ministers was called for the first of July. 
Arbenz  felt secure with the Army and planned to arm the peasants but 
June 15 brought him a rude shock:    the Army sent the President a list 
of questions about communists in power,  and June 18 brought revolt 
under  Castillo Armas. 
Guatemala called the revolt invasion and appealed to  the 
Security Council and the Organization of American States for help. 
She soon withdrew her request to  the Organization of American States 
thenceforward seeking help only in the Security Council.     With the 
omnipresent veto a resolution calling  for a cease  fire  was all that 
could be passed. 
While the Security Council met and the Organization of American 
States  decided to  send an investigating  committee—at the request of 
the accused aggressors,   Nicaragua and Honduras—the rebels in Guate- 
mala gained support.     The Army refused to  fight or to arm the peasant 
militia.    After days of confusion Arbenz,  alone and defeated,  resigned 
on June 27.    Hundreds flocked to embassies for asylum,   including the 
ex-President,  and Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas became the new 
President of Guatemala.    A communist purge ended the era of the social 
revolution in Guatemala. 
The  story of the revolutionary years in Guatemala therefore 
requires a  study of the men and organizations  who grappled with issues 
and values to  shape the course of history. 
18 
In 19^ very few people outside the oligarchy denied the need 
for change in Guatemala.     She was a  "backward" nation,  her economy 
was dependent on  the world coffee market,  her political life  was  far 
from democratic  (though,   as Chester Lloyd Jones suggests,  her history 
left her unprepared for anything beyond an enlightened despot,     ) and 
her people desperately needed a new lease on life. 
Juan Jose Arevalo  seemed to  have found the path in his  "spirit- 
ual socialism".     Believing that life is more than  economics alone, 
the professor-President  wanted to   stimulate the intellectual life of 
the nation as  well.    He allowed a free exchange of ideas which had 
narrowed considerably by 195^»    His successor,   Jacobo Arbenz,   was 
caught in his own private life and the power of a  well-organized,   if 
small,   group of communists.     With the new ideas abroad in Guatemala 
the well established United Fruit Company became the whipping boy of 
a campaign against the "old ways" of "imperialism"—Yankee imperialism. 
And as  the old gave way to the new the power of labor syndicates united 
against the United Fruit Company and subsidiaries,   joining hands with 
the political power of communists to lead Arbenz on to his destiny. 
Jacobo Arbenz,   the Communist Party and its leaders,   the labor 
movement of Guatemala,  and the United Fruit Company had separate 
histories until 19%\  their individual stories shaped their years of 
conflict and turmoil,  195L-195^.     For this reason  we have chosen to 
separate the people and groups involved in the 195^ climax. 
12Chester Lloyd Jones,   Guatemala Past and Present (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press,  19^0). 
IV.     THE PROTAGONISTS 
A.     The United Fruit Company3"j 
This company worth millions of dollars today was born in 1870 
when Captain Lorenzo  Dow Baker loaded loO bunches of bananas on his 
fishing  schooner and headed from Jamaica to  Jersey City.     The bananas 
proved to be a  successful cargo and he began taking  the fruit to  Boston 
where Andrew Preston of Seaverns & Company sold the produce.    The two 
men persuaded nine others to  join them in 1885 to  form the Boston 
Fruit Company.     The new company prospered by selling bananas from the 
Caribbean isles. 
While Boston Fruit was prospering Minor C Keith, renowned for 
building railroads,  was developing a banana industry in Central 
America  to  ship to New Orleans.     The need for greater efficiency 
brought a merger in 1899:    the United Fruit Company,  owning 112 miles 
of railroad,   212,39^ acres of land with 61.263 in production,  and 
11,230,000 in capital.14    With Preston in Boston to  expand the markets 
and Keith in Central America  to build railroads the company had a 
capital of $215 million by 1930. 
In Guatemala by 1890 San Jose and Chamt>erico,   Pacific ports, 
were connected to  the capital city and Puerto  Barrios lacked 60 miles 
13See Stacy May and Galo Plasa,   The. M^j^J^ft * 
Latin America   (Washington: National Planning Association,  1953). 
Ik Ibid..  p.   7. 
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of rail to be connected to  the capital.     In 1904 Keith took over the 
136 finished miles to  complete the line.     The rest of the rail  system 
of Guatemala  was taken over  in 1912 in the birth of the International 
Railways of Central America (IRCA), operating 887 miles of track by 
1930.     Financial difficulties made International Railways of Central 
America seek help from the United Fruit Company in 1936.    The agree- 
ment stopped United Fruit from building a proposed port near its 
Tiquisate lands on the Pacific in order to use the rails to  the east. 
This  saved the International Railways of Central America from ruinous 
competition of a port close to the coffee lands of the Pacific.     But 
the agreement provided a point of disagreement with Guatemalans  who 
resented the special privileges of United Fruit on the rails. 
The contract with International Railways of Central America was 
not the only one to produce discord in Guatemala.    Her government 
agreements,   too,  made with early dictators,   caused resentment and a 
desire for chan-;e in 19^.     Lo" taxes,  exemptions,  and privileges had 
been granted to the company for developing jungle lands into profits 
for the company and the country.     As United Fruit grew the  fear of its 
power grew also-until little Guatemala  felt overwhelmed by "el pulpo" 
(the octopus).15    Though bananas are between 10 and 20* of Guatemalan 
exports each year.  United Fruit exports are around 7* of this  total. 
In this respect it is a large company providing  a major portion of 
the second largest export of Guatemala. 
15Ibid.,  p.  21. 
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A third point involving the United Fruit Company with the 
19^4 revolution is intimately involved  with agrarian reform:     the 
company lands  total over  four times the amount planted in bananas. 
The land is used to provide room for future expansion but a con- 
siderable amount is involved in providing housing   for workers,  crops 
for food,   facilities to  get the bananas to the market and to  control 
diseases.     Panama disease attacks the roots of the banana plant and 
the only  effective control has proved to be flooding the infected 
area.    This method, as well as control of a second major fungus pro- 
ducing the sigatoka blight, is feasible only on extensive tracts of 
land.     To be efficient  (until the late 1950's brought new methods) 
a banana producer needed to  work on a large scale operation.     In 
spite of this it is fair to say that United Fruit holdings were far 
larger than required at the time Arbenz  came to power. 
Looking at both sides the United Fruit is put in proper 
perspective and yet it is often at a disadvantage In Latin America 
because it is viewed from the past and from its impact on local 
economies.    In Guatemala the United Fruit Company is the largest 
private  enterprise,  operating Liquisate  (18,000 acres of bananas) 
and Bananera,   almost wiped out by disease.    At Bananera the lands 
once used for bananas have been converted to  food crops because 
Panama disease impedes replanting bananas.     To add to its own pro- 
duction United Fruit has 10.000 acres in contracts with independent 
farmers  who receive technical assistance and disease control in return 
for which the company buys the bananas produced.     Except when Ubico 
froze wages on the United Fruit plantations,  the company workers 
16 Ibid.. p. 82, 
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averaged over twice as much income per day as other agricultural 
workers.     Though the record shows United Fruit as an enlightened 
foreign investor in  juatemala in the 1950's,   the company became 
the focal point of hatred in  the campaign against United States 
imperialism.     The company came under  fire as  "el pulpo",   running 
Guatemalan railroads   (IRCA) communications system  (telephone and 
telegraph),   and,   to  a lesser extent,   the Electric  Company.     With 
the agrarian reform law United Fruit lands were expropriated in 
large amounts and the bonds for payment were at the 1930 value of 
the land.     This  was the listed rate for taxation and United Fruit 
appealed the decision.     The State Department intervened on behalf 
of the company and thus became the "stooge" of the United Fruit 
Company.     The labor movement added to  the trials of the company by 
striking  for as much as a month at a  time as they did in Hay-June, 
195*K     l&th the advantage of hindsight we can say that United Fruit 
could have been more  compromising  with the revolutionary govern- 
ments.     But it is also true that the campaign of hatred damaged 
United Fruit property as well as its reputation.    Admitted!/,   the 
United Fruit Company left itself open to criticism for owning land 
it did not need and for refusing to negotiate with the new govern- 
ment.     Compared to Guatemala the company is a colossus though it 
is one of the smallest of the major United States corporations.     A 
more adequate evaluation requires a look at the opponents of the 
United Fruit Company. 
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B.     The Communist Party of Guatemala 
Communism had been heard of in   iuatemala before the October 
Revolution.     In the 1920's  Juan Pablo  Wainright had helped with the 
beginnings,  but Ubico put an end to these first attempts to  establish 
a Party.     Vfeinright and the other leaders appeared in EL Salvador 
and took part in the attempted 1932 revolution. 
With Ubico out of power and a new constitution Marxist leaders 
appeared on the  scene again.    Marxists  from other Latin American 
countries  went to  the new Guatemala:     Salvadoreans,   Chileans, 
..exicans including the labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano.     The 
process of organizing proceeded rapidly. 
In 19^5 the Escuela  Claridad was opened under Abel Cuenca. 
Organization of labor syndicates had already begun.    A number of 
young  Guatemalans  were taking positions of leadership;   chiefs among 
this group were Jose Manuel Fortuny,  Victor Manuel Gutierrez  (labor 
leader),   Bernardo Alvarado Monz6n.  Alfredo Guerra  Borges,  and Carlos 
Manual Pellecer  (in Escuintla he ran the peasant movement in 
a rarian reform). 
Fortuny became the undisputed leader of the party.  Born in 
191' in the department of Santa Rosa he quit his university career 
to become a radio announcer.  *th the revolution in 1** he became 
active in politics and became Secretary General of the government 
coalition.  On the side he founded the secret Vanguardia Democratica 
-which became the Communist Party of Guatemala in W. '  In 19^ 
^Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (Hew Jersey, 
Rutgers University Press, 1957). P« 356. 
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he became secretary of the organization but until 1950 the Party 
remained in  secrecy. 
The Party was not completely free to move during Arevalo's 
Presidency and caution was used to advance the goals of the Party. 
In 19^6 Arevalo  closed the Marxist Escuela Claridad and sent several 
key men on dinlomatic missions:    Carlos Manuel Pelleoer  was  sent to 
T ft 
Paris;  Alfredo Ouerra  Borges was also among  those  sent abroad. 
While labor was being organized other mass organizations were 
formed in 19^7.     The Alianza  de Juventud Democratica de Guatemala, 
Alianza  Femenina  juatemalteca (in which Sefiora de Arbenz  was active), 
and others were active in Peace Congresses.     Even artists and writers 
were organized in the Saker-Ti.    Opposition groups existed but lacked 
the close coordination of the Communist front groups;   their  splinter- 
ing led to their gradual loss of what power they might have had in 
unity. 
In May 19^9 the break into the open began as Fortuny led a group 
of communists out of the government coalition,   the Partido de Acci6n 
Revolucionaria.     They again founded a Marxist school,  Jacobo  Sanchez, 
under Alfredo -luerra Borges with Victor Manuel Gutierrez;  but the 
19 .minister of Government closed this one down. 
With Arbenz as President the Communist Party gained strength 
openly.    Their candidates were supported by the government in the 
1953 Congressional elections and five Communists  were elected to 
18 'Samayoa,   EL Quetzal no  es rojo,  p.  116. 
^Ibid.,  p.  1^2. 
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Congress, quickly gaining positions of power in the legislatux-o. 
In 1952 the Party officially registered in its own right with Fortuny 
still at its head.     Though no  Communists were ever in the official 
cabinet the home of the President was a salon for Marxist discussion. 
Maria  Cristina Vilanova de Arbenz was an excellent hostess,  and good 
friends of the President,   such as Fortuny,  frequented his home. 
The President of Guatemala could also  say that the top govern- 
ment agencies were not Communist.    However,   the Instituto Guatemalteco 
de Seguridad Social came under Party control after Arbenz  came to 
power.     In 1952 Decree 900 established agrarian reform as law and a 
national Agrarian Department was set up;   '.feldemar Barrios KLee, 
openly a Party member,   was among the leaders.     Pellecer was in charge 
of the reform in Escuintla and the peasants soon learned that 
communism and Arbenz had given them land.     They were  encouraged to 
take over land and "denounce" it for expropriation and Escuintla be- 
came  the center of terror as violence soon was out of Party control. 
Chaos in rural areas was accompanied by labor  strikes in urban 
centers and Communist power snowballed.     In 1953 the Jacobo Sanchez 
school was reopened.     Radio  was in the hands of the government aides; 
as Arbenz  said,   "Communists are the strongest supporters of my   -overn- 
ment.S°Even Congress helped:  to honor Stalin at his  death it held a 
minute of silence.21    By 195^ Communist Party members had become key 
20Jorge del Valle llatheu.  La yerdad spbre el Icaso  de 
Guatemala1   (Guatemala,  1956)t  p. W. 
21Samayoa,   EL Quetzal no es rojo,  p.  189. 
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figures in the government,   supporting and advising  President Arbenz. 
The President refused overtures of the Organization of Central 
American  States and the Organization of American States,  and his 
Army to cut back the power of the Party.    As Toriello announced in 
Caracas,   Communism is an idea and is therefore incapable of inter- 
vention in government.     But the government supporting and supported 
by Fortuny and his  Party was not to last much longer.     Financial 
difficulties, lack of Army support, and lack of thorough peasant 
control combined to leave Arbenz unable to oppose the invading  rebels. 
The Party of strong  support for the government lacked the real power 
to  survive;   their  attempts  to  win  support of the Roman Catholic  Church 
and the Army were unsuccessful.     Communists had been trained to  fill 
the leadership vacuum caused by the end of the dictatorship.    Bat 
their power,  in the final encounter, proved to be small and intellectual, 
and intellect cannot fight guns.    In leadership their main source of 
power had been the infant labor syndicates which we shall now examine. 
C.    Labor Movement of Guatemala 
Before October 1*M cheap Indian labor was  considered one of 
the great natural resources of the country.    The hacendados using 
old and inefficient production methods needed cheap labor in order 
to make a profit.     Jorge Ubico helped the  situation by  establishing 
that all  workers  (and Indians) carry work cards;   on these the number 
of days of work  should be marked until they had fulfilled their 
required amount of work.     Illiterate Indians thus became easy prey 
for the land owners and Indian labor on the coffee haciendas continued 
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to bring in profit.    To avoid competition from a major hiring company, 
in 1936 Ubico  fixed wages on United Fruit lands at 50/t per day instead 
of the $1.   which the company was prepared to pay.22    In spite of this 
limitation United Fruit was the highest paying land owner in Guatemala. 
With the situation set so  definitely against the  working man it 
is logical that the revolution  would bring  syndication of labor and 
labor unrest in a  fi;ht for rights he had never known.    Lacking  strong 
organization the infant movement quickly fell  to  the men trained under 
the guidance of Vicente Lombardo Toledano.     His affiliation with the 
Marxist labor movement  set the tone for Guatemala.     As head of the 
Congreso  de Trabajadores de America Latdna he arrived in 19^+6  to  study 
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the situation.     By 195L all labor syndicates  had been united. 
But things had begun to happen even before the arrival of 
Lombardo  Toledano.     Teachers organized in 19^,  railroad workers  soon 
followed and others were organized in rapid succession.     When  the 
Marxist school was formed in 19^5 the Sindicato de Accion y 
Mejoramiento  Ferrocarrilero  (railroad syndicate) left the organization 
of syndicates  (Congreso de Trabajadores Guatemaltecos) but the 
teachers remained with the  secretary of the Congreso de Trabajadores 
Guatemaltecos,  Victor Manuel Gutierrez.    The separated group could not 
live long; in 19^7 it rejoined the communist leaders in the Congreso 
Nacional de Union Sindical,   which joined the Russian-dominated World 
Federation of Trade Unions 
2k 
22 
Zh 
Ibid.,  p. 157. 
Samayoa,   EL Quetzal no  es rojo,  p.  112. 
2;3VaHe Matheu,  La Verdad,  p.   97. 
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With labor organized politics entered the scene and a political 
committee was formed for the union.    By 19^7 the picture was very 
optimistic for labor.    In May Arevalo himself spoke to the Workers1 
meeting  to  announce the promulgation of his Labor  Code.    This pro- 
tected the  workers above all others and with the Presidency of Arbenz 
strikes were almost continuous in the country.     Dock workers  forced 
the government to  take over the administration of the port of San Jose. 
Railway  workers and electrical workers also brought times of crisis to 
their companies.    And United Fruit was hit time and time again by 
strikes for higher wages,  shorter hours, and more privileges.    Labor 
unrest had become  so important in producing  the  situation  that the 
New York Times,  on June Ik, carried the  story of the end of a month- 
Ion:  strike of 4.000  workers.25    The labor syndicates helped produce the 
economic and political chaos which brought Arbenz   to  the end of his 
career. 
The final result of the actions taken by labor was unexpected, 
for their primary aim had been to  support nationalist feelings and 
the President.    Labor,   both urban and rural,   was able to provide 
marches in  support of the President at any time.     'With mass demonstra- 
tions of thousands it seemed unlikely  that he could lose his .o.ular- 
ity and power in  just a matter of days. 
The support seen in these mass meetings  was perhaps mislead- . 
tag but in a sense it was genuine.     The workin: man had never before 
had such freedom and he was told that the government with Party help 
25The New -ork Times,  June lfr, 195^- 
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had made this possible.     The peasants,   too,   were tau;ht that they were 
indebted to  the President and the Party.    It was the first time  some- 
one had bothered to  do anything  for them and therefore gratitude in 
the shape of loyalty was  forthcoming.     When the time came to  fight, 
however,  no arms  were given to the working peasants because the Army 
refused to  cooperate.     Basically farmers and workers lacking a tho- 
rough indoctrination,   the mass of people under Communist leadership 
did not rise to  support Arbenz,  making it possible for Castillo Armas 
to  succeed.    Arbenz, the key figure,   was forced to  resi :n because he 
failed to unite the country. 
D.      president Jacobo Arbenz Guzman 
Jacobo Arbenz Guzman,   son of a Swiss-born  pharmacist and a 
mestizo mother,   was born in Quezaltenango in 1913-    Appointed to the 
Escuela Politecnica  (the West Point of Guatemala) Arbenz graduated 
and gradually rose in the ranks of the Army.     As a lieutenant he 
married the daughter of a wealthy and aristocratic Salvadorean coffee 
family,  Maria Cristina Vilanova,  a college graduate.     Because she 
married far beneath her  station the young couple  were outcasts in 
both Salvadorean and Guatemalan society.     Determined and ambitious 
Maria Cristina became a decisive influence on her husband. 
The Arbenz couple grew to hate the society which had cast them 
out and.   though Jacobo  became a captain under Ubico.   the young officer 
felt a personal dislike of the dictator who  represented the  society 
which had snubbed him.26    He played an important role in overthrowing 
26David James.   Red Design for  the Americas:     Guatemalan Prel- 
ude (New York:    Praeger," M*h  P-   #• 
f 
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the dictator and as a member of the triumvirate helped write the new 
Constitution of Guatemala. 
In her own  way Maria  Gristina Vilanova de Arbenz  reacted 
ajainst society.    An intellectual youn^  woman she read Marx avidly and 
her friends in Guatemala  were of similar ideas.     Her tertulias  were 
popular and,   in her home,  Marx was the usual topic of discussion.     The 
Fortunys were regulars at the Arbenz  home;  other Latin Americans  who 
flocked to Guatemala  were also  welcome.    Vicente Lombardo Toledano  was 
among  these.27    The wife of the Minister of  Defense under Arevalo and 
then  wife of the President,   Senora de Arbenz  proved to be courageous 
as well as ambitious.28    As a Marxist leader  she  was active in the 
mass organizations affiliated with the Communist Party.     Her philosophy 
and her personal ambition combined with her intelligence to become the 
subtle influence on Jacobo Arbenz. 
*ien Arbenz became the President in 1951 the triumphant woman 
at his side openly demonstrated her affiliations.     The Communist 
Party members gradually assumed responsible positions in the govern- 
ment though never was one placed in an official top executive position. 
Fortuny remained a close friend and adviser to Arbenz though he  was 
defeated in the 1953 Congressional elections. 
The most revolutionary bill passed by Congress under Arbenz was, 
of course, the agrarian reform law. Railroaded through Congress it was 
clearly unconstitutional on at least one count:     The ultimate power  was 
2? 
28 
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vested in  the executive combining  in  the President both executive 
(administrative) and judicial  (appeal) powers. 
In the Constitution of 19^5 latifundios  were specifically 
29 
declared illegal. With proper indemnization,   expropriation of 
private property  "in the  public  interest"  was declared permissible. 
The Ley de Reforma Agraria declared its purpose to be a change in 
landholding to  further the economic  development of the country.    No 
land cultivated by the owner could be expropriated,  and if the owner 
had less than 223 acres he was not subject to  expropriation at all. 
The   government fincas (taken  from jerman owners during  ifcrld 
War II)  were to be divided into  individual plots or into  cooperatives 
if the workers wished.     This was the first step taken but the land 
remained under government ownership;   the workers  were given lifetime 
use of it,  paying  the government Jh of the crop value per annum. 
In the case of private lands the government could grant life- 
time use or direct ownership to the peasant.     In the latter case it 
could not be sold for 25 years.     In  expropriation of private lands 
the payment was in long-term agrarian bonds of the amount listed as 
the value of the land for  taxation in 1952.     This value  was assessed 
in the 1930's and was generally  far below the actual value of the 
land.30 
The idea behind the program was a good one;  however the 
usufructo vitalicio  clause was apparently a political means of 
29Latifundlo  comes from the Latin meaning large land holdings, 
such as  the haciendas and fincas of juatemala. 
30, Whetten,  Guatemala,  r>.   159- 
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government control of the peasants.-'      Of the total acreage  (917,659) 
distributed before Arbenz left power,  86.2)1 was for lifetime use. 
This is according to government records,   which were denounced by the 
Castillo  government as inflated with regard to  the actual distri- 
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bution. The possibility of inaccuracy is accompanied by the  fact 
of chaos in 195^ and the resulting  confusion in the records.     It is 
hard,  if not impossible,  to  tell how much land was actually ^iven to 
peasants. 
In  spite of the political intentions of the agrarian reform the 
peasants played an important role in the Presidency of Arbenz.     Far 
more than Arevalo,  Arbenz desired Party unity and complete  support 
for his government.     Peasant and worker demonstrations helped ,-lve him 
his false  security through 195^.     I" politics  the parties could not 
remain united for long.     Different ideologies and leaders refused to 
bow down to others.     In the 1953 Congressional  elections a government 
front of parties was  established.    After elections Arbenz  tried to con- 
vert it into a permanent liaison.    He had put his agrarian reform 
through but his strong need for unity led him to attempt what Arevalo 
had failed to achieve.     Arbenz lacked the idealism of Arevalo to attract 
people and he was not a  statesman or a politician.    His desire for 
support perhaps  explains his loyalty toward his staunchest supporters, 
the Communists.     It also  explains the tales of barbarity  supposedly 
^The Usufructo  vitalicio  clause of the agrarian reform law 
-:ave the peasant lifetime use of his lands but the ownership  was held 
by the  state. 
32Whetten,  Guatemala,  p.  16^. 
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carried out by oolice chiefs Cruz  Wer and Jaime Rosenberg.•'•'    Vfeether 
the  stories of cruel torture are true or untrue Arbenz,   in 1953 and 
195!+,   "discovered"  an amazing number of plots against the government 
and arrested the leaders,  his opponents.    At times the uprising  was 
real  (as in Salami,   in 1953) but,   as in January 195^.   it was often a 
plot discovered in the nick of time to  save the country from civil 
war. 
In saving his nation from disaster Arbenz  failed to  see that 
destruction  was imminent.     His country had been in a civil  war of a 
kind since  the agrarian reform took violence to the rural lands.     With 
coffee prices changing and precious coffee income being destroyed on 
the fincas bankruptcy  was also imminent.     With the war of nerves 
carried on by radio  from rebel broadcasts and the government within 
the country Castillo Armas could enter Guatemala in triumph. 
Jacobo Arbenz  had failed to  see the signs of the times;  his 
friends led hi* to believe in a  support which did not exist and 
Communists gave him an unrealistic view of the  situation.     The Arch- 
bishop's pen  struck a major blow at the roots of the Arbenz regime 
when ,k>nsenor Kariano Avellano y Rossell denounced Communist influ- 
ence.     But Arbenz  and his  friends  helped bring about their own 
destruction in 195^ 
At Caracas their  strong voice against the  communist agression 
manifesto  was a lonely note of sovereignty.    In June Arbenz  refused 
33^   „+ama-i«     Secretaria de Informaci6n de la Presidencia de 
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to recognize the military adght of the Army  in leaving unanswered the 
questions of the Army leaders.     Fortuny and his Party believed that 
arming  the peasants would save the country;   they,   too,   failed to 
reckon with the Army. 
Even before 195+ Arbenz  was preparing his  doom.     In allowing 
Communism to  become an open  (though not absolute) power in the  govern- 
ment he found the United States unwilling to help Guatemala.     In push- 
in ; the agrarian reform law through Congress he called for the hatred 
of the society that had once  snubbed him.    Arbenz  and his advisers 
proved to be more revolutionary than their time.    Unprepared to meet 
the situation of revolution,  the Americas  took the traditional path to 
smother the threat to  their lives of peacefulness.     The rebel leader 
staged a military coup and Arbenz,   supported nearly to the last by his 
friends of the Party,   finally faced the nation alone in resigning  from 
the Presidency.     .&thout support Jacobo Arbenz  explained he was leavin ; 
his office due to overpowering circumstances.    Alone and perhaps bitter 
as he faced his only possible choice,   that of exile.   Jacobo Arbenz 
remained an enigma.     His closing  words,   "Viva Guatemala!»,   suggest 
he was a nationalist above all.     In a moment of glory he led his 
small nation into a revolution which was perhaps  going astray.    Nation- 
alist,  Marxist,  President of Guatemala  for three tumultuous years,   in 
his defeat he remained true to himself.     Thus ended the story for 
Jacobo  Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala.     And thus began a controversy 
which remains unsettled today. 
V.  CONCLUSION: THE BIRTH OF A CONTROVERSY 
I 
The 19**4_ 5/+ period in the history of Guatemala seems to be a 
story of a revolution gone astray.     This description,  correct on the 
surface,   is  too  glib and easy to be accepted by the writer.    One can 
read countless versions of the history;   they will say that either 
the revolution was communist inspired by 195+ or  the revolution was 
snuffed out by the United States in 195*+.    In 1958 Julio Adolfo Rey 
seemed to  explain  the  situation in his statement: 
"Perhaps the most important truth that emerges 
from the recent literature on Guatemala is 
that the real issues underlying the controversy 
are not those of fact,  but those of value."-^ 
The controversy lies not in the course of actions but in the 
motivations and in the people who  directed the path of history. 
The controversy born in Guatemala in 195^ produced a volum- 
inous amount of literature on the subject,    rlany Guatemalans and 
other Americans  wrote accounts of the revolutionary era of this  small 
country.     The ignominious end of the Presidency of Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzman was  the beginning of a heated discussion which has no answer 
due to  the nature of the issues.     This  fact is clearly  seen in a sur- 
34Julio Adolfo  Rey,   "Revolution and Liberation:    a Review of 
Recent Literature on the Guatemalan Situation,"  Hispanic American 
Historical Review,   XXXVIII  (1953).  239-55- 
vey of the printed words of some of the  people involved or aroused 
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by the events in 195^. 
Robert J.  Alexander.     Communism In Latin America.  New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press,  1957 • 
This book is a  survey of all the countries in Latin America 
and the development of the Communist Party in each.    The beginning 
chapters outline the history and trends of the Party;   the succeeding 
chapters show how the general ideas  evolved in  each country.     His 
chapter on Guatemala deals particularly  with the labor movement,  one 
of the keys to  Communist control in Latin America. 
Chester Lloyd Jones.     Guatemala Past and Present. 
bitten during the rule of Jorge Ubico  Jones provides the 
necessary historical background for the  succeeding years.     In the 
light of more recent events his thesis  with regard to Ubico is partic- 
ularly meaningful.     He expresses the belief that Guatemala  was un- 
prepared for democracy and,  therefore,   a  strong leader was essential 
in  the 1930's.     His insight becomes  significant only after a  study 
of the ten years of the revolution. 
Nathan Laselle ttietten.     Guatemala the Land and the People. 
Though the main purpose of this book is not concerned with the 
3^The writer was unable to  secure various books,   due to their 
scarcity 2\E country.     However,  a  sampling of JJP^^T *« 
of the  written materials have been covered.     «fe have arbitrarily 
arran!erihem in this presentation according  to  their use and their 
point of view. 
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revolution the author  was  forced to deal  with the events of 19^ 5*+. 
A sociological  study,   Button's  Guatemala provides an excellent 
account of agrarian reform actualities.     It does not discuss political 
and personal  feelings in this very controversial aspect of Arbenz' 
years as President. 
Whetten adds  to the emphasis of change for the Indian which was 
studied by Richard Adams,   editor of Political Changes in Guatemalan 
Indian Communities;     a Symposium.    These two books lead one to  the 
inescapable conclusion that the revolution brought changes  which will 
not allow juatemala  to return completely to her old ways.     These are 
proof that the abortive social revolution,  a failure politically,   was 
not a  total failure. 
Stacy May and Galo Plaza.     The United Fruit Company in Latin America. 
This case study of United States business performance abroad 
is a good record for the United Fruit Company.    It is favorable to the 
company in its conclusions  but it is one of the few,  if not the only 
account which contains data of the United Fruit records in  Guatemala. 
The book also  provides a comparison of the records of the company in 
each country,   adding  perspective to  the Guatemalan case. 
Ronald M.  Schneider.     Communism in Guatemala 19^19^. 
This is a very detailed study of the development of the 
Communist Party and its activities in the years of revolution.     It 
is a  full account of the leaders and their influence in Guatemala. 
The book is informative and deals with the subject in a factual manner, 
avoiding involvement in the issues and politics.     The importance lies 
in  the approach to  the wealth of detail presented in the book. 
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EL Salvador,   Secretaria de Inforraaci6n.     De la Neutralidad vigilante 
a la Medlacl&n con Guatemala. 
This is a collection of documents and world press reports on 
events  during  the Presidency of Arbenz  from the withdrawal of 
Guatemala  from the Organization of Central American States  to  the 
triumph of Castillo Armas as the new President. 
United States Department of State.     Intervention of International 
Communism in Guatemala. 
The State Department published this booklet soon after the 
fall of Arbenz.     It uses the information to  point to a master plan 
of a Communist take-over of juatemala.     Basically the account is 
useful to  show the attitude of the United States  toward the Arbenz 
government. 
Daniel James.    Red Design for  the Americas:    Guatemalan Prelude. 
As  the title suggests  James'   thesis is that the Communist 
Party had a master plan to  take over the Americas  from Guatemala. 
In general the book provides a (;ood account of the decade of 
revolution.     But it is the opinion of this  writer that James is 
unable to prove his major thesis.     However,   Daniel James  was one 
of the first to  write the Guatemalan  story in this country and his 
book has become an important study of a revolution that failed. 
Juan Jose Arevalo.     Discursos en la Fresidencia,   19^1 W 
La  democracia y_ el imnerio. 
It is necessary to read some of Arevalo's  writings and 
speeches before 195* to obtain a proper perspective for La democracia 
y_ el imperio.    Arevalo,  a teacher and idealist,   was a failure in 
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politics.     His  speeches and writings  show the nobility of a great man. 
In his essay Istmania he transcends nationality to call for unity in 
Central America as the beginning of progress. 
But,   in 195" •  Arevalo  was a disillusioned and embittered man. 
The revolution to  which he had given six years of his life  was seem- 
ingly wiped out.     La  democracia y_ el imnerio  is a vituperative attack 
on the United States and the United Fruit Company.    Arevalo  believed 
that these  were the cause of the success of  Castillo Armas but he 
predicted a short term for the new government,  believing that democracy 
would succeed in  spite of this setback. 
La democracia jr el imperio is important, not for the account 
of events, but for the depth of feeling and conviction of a man in- 
volved in the revolution because he believed in it. 
Guillermo  Toriello  Garrido.    La batalla de Guatemala. 
The author was the Foreign Minister of Guatemala during the first 
months of 195*.    As such he was an important figure during the June 
crisis.     He led the  delegation to  Caracas and firmly denied the exist- 
ence of communist influence in Guatemala.     He believed that the United 
Fruit Company was the only source of tension between his country and 
the United States and that this set in motion plans to overthrow the 
Arbenz government. 
These beliefs and his position in the Arbenz regime  shaped the 
argument of the book he wrote.     He included an analysis of the first 
months of the Castillo government,  emphasizing his belief in the 
revolution  which ended in 195".    The result is a  well-organized argu- 
ment of a brilliant mind.    Toriello is one of the most convincing 
writers who  favored Arbenz. 
i+0 
Clemente Marroquin Rojas.     La  derrota de una batalla. 
Clemente Marroquin Rojas was quite unconvinced by Toriello's 
arguments and wrote a reply to La batalla de Guatemala.     A news- 
paperman with a  sharp tongue,  Marroquin takes  each major point and 
tears it apart paragraph by paragraph.     His main  thesis is that 
Arbenz and Toriello  tried to fight the "colossus of the North" openly 
instead of using quiet diplomatic channels,   the only path to  success 
where the United States is involved.     The book is very readable but 
does not fulfill its main purpose of proving the worthlessness of 
Toriello *s La batalla de Guatemala. 
Manuel Galich.     Por que lucha Guatemala;    Arevalo y_ Arbenz,  dos 
hombres contra un inreerio. 
The author of this book was convinced,  as  was Arevalo,  that 
Guatemala became a part of the empire of the United States when Castillo 
Armas became President.    Galich deals extensively with the causes of 
failure of the revolution though he remains loyal to  the ideas of 
social change.     In the light of the  events of 195" he suggests that 
social reforms  should have been established before democracy was 
attempted.     However,   the main reason for the failure of June 195" 
came from without:     forces opposed to the revolution and its resultant 
changes became unified and found the strength to  end the Presidency of 
Arbenz. 
MaPl«  Efrain Najera Farfan.     Lgs estafadores de la de.nocracia. 
Hombres v_ hechos en Guatemala. 
The author was a member of the party which,   in 19"".   called 
Arevalo back  from Argentina  to run for President.     However,  Mario 
Efrain Najera believed that the revolution was betrayed by Arbenz. 
This book is unique in its support for one man while rejecting his 
successor. 
iuatemala,   Seoretaria de Informacion de la Presidencia de la Republica. 
Genoaidio  sobra Guatemala. 
It is  almost unnecessary to  say that this is clearly a piece of 
propaganda of the Castillo Armas rejime.    Published six months after 
Arbenz  was ousted the book tells of the horrors perpetuated by the 
social revolution and its communist leaders.     The stories and photo- 
graphs lack  supporting   evidence.     The book is valuable only as an 
example of the Castillo Armas propaganda against Arbenz and Communism. 
Leon de Gandarias.     Democracia la major arma contra  el communismo. 
Another piece of propaganda,   this booklet was sponsored by the 
overnment.     It is as its  title suggests,  a defense of democracy 
rather than an attack on the previous regime. 
Jor ;e  de Valle Matheu.     La verdad sobre  el 'caso  de Guatemala'. 
This third publication under government auspices deals directly 
with the era  of the social revolution;   in this it is less propagandis- 
ts than the previous two.    However,   it is an attempt to  discredit all 
pro-Arbenz arguments.     The emphasis is on events of the first six months 
of 195^ which,  according to the author,  clearly prove that communists 
were the leaders of Guatemala.     It is important that throughout his 
arguments Valle does not attempt to  establish *roof that Arbenz  was 
himself a Communist. 
-i 
Carlos Samayoa  Chinchilla.     EL Quetzal no  es rojo. 
Samayoa  has written a defense of Guatemalans in his account of 
the revolutionary decade in his homeland.    His basic theme is that, 
though Communists gained positions of power,   they  did not express 
the feelings of the majority.    In dealing  with Arbenz he attempts  to 
explain rather  than criticize the actions of the  President,    tfore 
than other  Guatemalan authors,  Samayoa comes  close to discovering 
"36 the real issues involved. -^ 
John D.   Martz.     Communist Infiltration in Guatemala. 
This is  a rather brief survey of the use of communism during 
the presidencies of Arevalo and Arbenz.     The general approach is more 
critical than that taken by the same author in 1959. 
 .       Central America:    The Crisis and the Challenge. 
This is a survey of the politics of each country of Central 
America  with a  pessimistic outlook for the future.     In the chapter 
on Guatemala Martz  shows that the beginning  °f a  social revolution 
has been almost totally wiped out by the successors of Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzman. 
Jaime Diaz  Aozzotto.     EL caractsr do la revolucion ruatemalteca:  Ocaso 
de la revoluci6n democratico-burguosa corriente. 
This is  a history of the  social revolution of Guatemala, 
bitten after  it had apparently ended,   the book is a Marxist inter- 
pretation of the decade scanning the ^residencies of Arevalo and Arbenz. 
^See the quotation  from Julio Adolfo Rey,  at footnote  Jk. 
kl 
Luis Cardoza y Arag6n.    La revolucion guatemaltoca. 
The simple title belies the complexity of a poet's inter- 
pretation of the revolution.     The author's political affiliation with 
communism colors his views.    This book,  however,   emphasizes the birth 
of the controvers/.     Cardoza y Aragon asks more questions than he 
answers,  more questions than can be answered.     The poet's insight 
shows that he understood the nature of the controversy. 
II 
Of the many people involved in the revolution in Guatemala 
(19^-195^) there were few who realized the full significance of 
all that occurred. 
People who  supported Arbenz  felt that all  was lost in June 
195+ and his opponents were quite certain that the days of evil were 
gone forever. 
Castillo Armas quickly assumed power and carried out a  tho- 
rough purge of all communist-affiliated people in the government. 
He repealed the agrarian reform law and set forth a new method of 
reform,  less conducive to  violence.     The new agrarian reform,   slow 
moving  from its inception,  ground to an almost complete  standstill by 
the time the President was assassinated in 1957.     Apparently the social 
revolution  was dead. 
Guatemala had taken a step back to her old ways after Arbenz 
fled the country but the ideas and changes introduced to  the people, 
and especially  to  the Indians,   were enough to hold the door open to 
further change.     The United Fruit Company donated a large tract of land 
for the government resettlement program.     Discussion of the revolution 
continues,   for the controversy born of the Presidency of Jacobo Arbenz 
has no  real answers. 
The  discernible facts do not point to one person or group as 
the sole cause of it all.    Arbenz  fell from power because the situation 
H 
of pressure groups interacting brought a crisis to Guatemala.     Be- 
cause he was Jacobo Arbenz  juzrain,  married to i*aria Cristina Vilanova, 
his resignation was forthcoming  soon after Castillo Armas entered 
Guatemala.     In exile he re-encountered his old friends of the Presidency; 
Arbenz  went to Czechoslovakia.     In the era of Arbenz,   who at times 
molded but  was often the subject of his destiny,   we find the birth 
of a controversy. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adams,   Richard N.   (ed.).     Political Changes In Guatemalan Indian 
Communities:     a Symposium.    New Orleans:     Tulane  University, 
1957- 
Alexander,   Robert J.     Communism in Latin Arierioa.    New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press,  1957. 
Arevalo,   Juan Jose.    La democracia y_ el imperio.     Santiago, 
Chile, 195^. 
•     Discursos en la Presidencia,  19^5-^8. 
Guatemala,  19^. 
 .     Escritos politicos j discursos.     Havana, 1953. 
Cardoza y Aragon,  Luis.    La revoluci6n t;uatemalteca.    Mexico 
City,  1955- 
Diaz Rozzotto,   Jaime.     El caracter de la revolucion (-»uatemalteca: 
Oca so  de la revoluci6n demoeratica-bur; ;uesa corriente. 
Mexico  City,  1958. 
Galich,   Manuel.     Por que lucha Guatemala:    Arevalo j Arbenz,   dos 
hombres  contra un imnerio. 
Gandarias,  Le6n de.     Democracia:    la mafjor arma contra  el cpmunismo. 
Guatemala,  1957. 
Guatemala,   Secretaria de Informacion de la Presidencia  de la 
Republica.     Genocidio  sobre Guatemala.     Guatemala,  195^• 
Herrinj,     Hubert Clinton,  A History of Latin America,  2d.  ed. ; 
"New York:    Knopf, 1961. 
James,   David.     Red Design  for the Americas:     Guatemalan Prelude. 
New York,  Praeger, 195^. 
James,  Preston Everett.    Latin America.   3d.   ed.;  New York: Odyssey 
Press,  1959. 
Jones,   Chester Lloyd.     Guatemala Past and Present.     Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota  Press,  1950. 
^7 
Marroquin Rojas,   Clemente.    La  derrota  de una batalla.    Guatemala, 
Marts,   John D.     Central America:    the  Crisis and the Challenge. 
Chapel Hill:     University of North Carolina Press,  1959. 
.     Communist Infiltration in Guatemala.    New York,  1956. 
May,  Stacy and Galo  Plaza.     The United Fruit Company in Latin 
America.     Washington:     National  Planning Association,  1953. 
Najera Farfan,  Mario  Efrain.     Lojs  estafadores de la democracla: 
Hombres y_ hechos en Guatemala.     Buenos Aires,  1956. 
The New York Times,  195^. 
Parker,   Franklin D.     The Central American Republics.     London: 
Oxford University Press, 196*1. 
Reina,  Ruben E.     Chinautla,  a   Guatemalan Indian  Community.    New 
Orleans:    Tulane University,  I960. 
Rey,   Julio Adolfo.     "Revolution and Liberation:     a Review of Recent 
Literature on the Guatemalan Situation,■  Hispanic American 
Historical Review,  XXXVIII (1958), 239-55- 
EL Salvador,   Secretaria de Informacion.     De la neutralidad Vigilante 
a la mediacion con Guatemala.     San Salvador,  13y*. 
Samayoa  Chinchilla,   Carlos.     EL Quetaal no  es ro.jo.    Guatemala,  1956. 
Schneider,  Ronald M.     Communism in Guatemala l&Mgg-   New York: 
Praeger, 1959. 
Toriello  Garrido,  Guillermo.     La batalla de Guatemala.    Mexico 
City,  1955. 
United States Department of State.     Intervention of International 
Communism in Guatemala.     Washington«    Government Publishxn- 
office,  19"5*. 
Valle Matheu,   Jor-e del.     La verdad sobre  el  'caso de Guatemala'.  1956. 
■Vhetten,  Nathan Laselle.     Guatemala:     The Land and the People. 
New Haven:    Yale University Press,  1961. 
APPENDIX 
Guatemala Retires from the Or -.anization 
of Central American States 
1.     Her letter of resignation. 
2.     Reply of EL Salvador. 
3.    Resolutions adopted as a result of the resignation of 
Guatemala. 
Guatemala, 4 de Abril de 1953. 
Seftor Ministro: 
Tengo cl honor <!•• dirigirme a Vuestra Bxcelencia para cx- 
ponerle, con la fran«;nr/a y cordialidad i|iio inapiran las rclacio- 
nea universalea de eat* Gobiemo eepecialmentc con las Rcpu- 
blicaa hecpianaa de la America ('< tral las siguien. > considera- 
cionea: 
Es evidente el eapfritu centroamcricanista de   Gc    . rno de 
Guatemala, el fervor con que SU pueblo siempre ha ma    ei     > el 
ideal de reconstruccion de la Patria grande y BUS knhe.os d< 
camiento y compression entre lo.s pueblos del Istmo.. 
Es tambicn conocido el entusiasmo con que esta Repiiblica ha 
buscado, en todo tiempo, los medios de llevar a una rcalizacidn 
feliz esos anhelos e ideak-s centroamericanistas, y sus esfuerzos 
constructive, leales j Miiceros, para craar la Organizacidn de los 
Estados Centroamericanos, como un instrumento que contribu- 
yera a unirnos y nos ayudara en la solucion de miestros proble- 
mas comunes. 
Desgraciadamente, Senor Ministro, poderos<.s ei« 1O1 inte- 
resados en mantener desunidos a los Estados de Am. • •■• en- 
tral, por una parte, y en impedir la revolucion demo< tica de 
Guatemala, por la otra, han sido causa do una aerie .1 hechoa 
graves que paao a exponer a Vuestra Excelencia. 
Gran parte de la prensa y los drganos de publicidad centre- 
americanos se han sumado a la campana de difamacion y calum- 
niaa, tendientea a fomentar actos de intervened, extranjera en 
nuestroa asuntos internos, impulaada por intereses extranjeios 
poderoaoa desde los primeros dias del triunfo de la Revoluci6n de 
194 I en nuestro pais. Esa campana constituye visiblemente una 
ag]  .-.on contra Guatemala. 
Aim cuando Tormalmente algunos Gobiernos Centroamerica- 
nos reiteran estar animados por el espiritu de confraternidad. 
ue es base fundamental y linica justificaci6n de la Carta de San 
Salvador, en la practica se han ignorado las nobles obhgacioncs 
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han hecho vi.sitas v fnntL.   • •,      sin contar con Guatemala «• 
Centre Am^.^^^aS^ «"• '°S Estad- * 
las que la prensa centro mil, r*S ei"an ,mP<>rtancia y a 
signiHcaria esa omi2^que ."sufta ser^'f 
d,'fUSi6n- Nada 
midad que expresamente seEii A*!f f ^"trana a la unani- 
86 tuviera la informal ™,£'1^ P de la Carta. »'" "0 
nuestro Gobierno ni sSs RepreinhXpn r °ficia,me"te ante 
que en esas reuniones s-Xff es en Centi-oamerica—, de 
que a iniciativa de  a Sncfflerf.%iiS22tkh' COmo se diJ°- 
Honduras,  El Salvador   w£,vi     Sa]yad°"na se suscribi6 por 
pacto vomz-sssr^srsrSrfls (?
ic*y ,panama'un 
comunismo", en la nrit-tirn »i «   pr.etexto <>e "contrarrestar el 
b.oque ^^SjGSSaa1- QUC  3 C0"Stituci6» ** «» 
gual que con el pretexto de los circulos internacionales que pre 
paran y provocan una intervencion en los asunto, iSernos de 
nuestro pais, persiguiendo destruir la democracia gua emalteca 
y proteger los .ntereses de los monopolios que operan en e7a Na- 
ci6n como en el resto de las Naciones Centroamericanas 
tun;^!?08'0"5" reaccjonaria local, fracasada en multiples opor- 
tumdades en sus prop6sitos subversives y antidemocraticos, ha 
hecho suya la propuesta del Gobierno Salvadoreno y pretende 
hSK 5 ^ dG el!aJ'^
S °bjetivOS <ue no ha P°did° nacer nasta la fecha una reahdad por falta de respaldo popular. Tal 
Rituacion es intolerable para el Gobierno de Guatemala y perju- 
clica gravementc las normalcs rclaciones entrc los Estados Cen- 
troamencanos. 
En estos mismos momentos nuestro Gobierno ha superado 
una prueba mas, que al inferno tiempo que reitera su solidez de 
ampho respaldo popular pone dd manificsto que la conspiraci6n 
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h££fifi rSbfsa l0S Ifmites de sus fronteras. E„ cfecto- plazas 
.mi ortante* del centre de la Republica, con fecha 29 de? mes de 
mar .0 fueron asaltadas por gente armada con ,*rtrechos e™ran- 
jeros y se sabe ya que esperaban auxilios aereos proccd'entes del 
SH ?V'eZ su.bi;tancia«lo e> «umario. iniciado por atorida 
des competentes. senalaremos el origen de tales conexiones 
Respondiendo a la consulta que democraticamente realizd mi 
ScarT°la
en rClaC1 •" a 'a Co,'ferencia ** Cancilleres Ccn? oam™ 
mSSK S r'fImaci0nes democraticas han coincidido en de- 
n andar del Gob.erno que se retire de la ODECA, considerando 
que SU pcrmancnc.a or, la misma compromcto, en los actuates mo- 
ment, s la roberanta, la .ndependencia nacional y la libre realiza- 
tion de los objctivo.s do la Revoluci6n guatemalteca. 
Por tanto ante la situaci6n general, mi Gobierno so ha visto 
en la necesldad de dirigirse a la Organizaci6n do las Nacioncs 
UIKIHS y al Conse.io de Seguridad, denunciando las amenazas de 
mtervencidn, en nota cuya copia se acompana a la prescnte Por 
las mismas ra/ones, el Gobierno de Guatemala denuncia la Carta 
do San Salvador y se retira de la Organizaci6n de Estados Ccn- 
troamencanos (ODECA). 
No obstante esta decisi6n, mi Gobierno reitera de manera 
categ6rica su lealtad a los ideales centroamcricanistas v, en con- 
secuencia, esta presto a concertar en el futuro todos aqtiellos con- 
venios que persigan favorecer el desarrollo de la economfa na- 
cional de los paises Centroamericanos, a elevar el nivel de vida de 
los pueblos y favorecer un cstrecho y fraternal intercambio cul- 
tural centroamericano. 
Sirvase aceptar Vuestra Excelencia mis altas muestras de 
consideraci<5n y aprecio. 
■ 
(f)  Raul Oscgucda 
Ministro de Rclaciones Exteriores. 
Excmo. seiior don Roberto E. Canessa, 
Ministro de Rclaciones Exteriores, 
San Salvador, EL SALVADOR. 
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PALACIO NACIONAL 
San Salvador, 9 do abril do 1953 
DEPARTAMENTO DE ORGANISMOS 
A'TERNACIONALES 
A-800- 
Excelencia 
D 791 
Con gran sorpresa se ha enterado mi Gobierno, por su nota 
>"'■' 4785 fechada el 4 de abril de 1953, de que el Gobierno de Gua- 
•.. mala denuncift la Carta de San Salvador y se retira de la Orga- 
nizaci6n de Estados Centroamericanos. Es mayor el sentimiento 
que tal actitud produce, al tomar en cuenta que el Gobierno Gua- 
Umalteco no solo trata de fundamentar tal actitud en motivos 
•.otalmeiite injustificados, sino que aprovecha la oportunidad pa- 
r, inferir graves ofensa.s a los gobiernos y pueblos hermanos, 
iiribuyo! >les hechos e intenciones totalmente alejados de la 
.crdad. La ademas lamentable que este paso negativo en la po- 
litica centroamericana del Gobierno Guatemalteco tome como pre- 
rexto una absurda confabulation internacional para intervenir en 
asunt ,s .'nternos de Guatemala y trale de malograr un orga- 
.smo QU. .iermite concebir fundadas esperanzas en el porvenir, 
a que las conriciones de inestabilidad internacional en que nues- 
.ros Eatadoa se han debatido a lo largo de su historia, se deben 
■recisamcue a que no han sabido formar un frente comun de in- 
.ereses y de propdsitos. El sentimiento centroamericanista de que 
-eiteradamente ha hecho alarde el Gobierno de Guatemala, al que 
ilude en su citada nota, se ve desmentido por hechos tan deploi/a- 
t.us como es el repudio de la Organizaci6n de Estados Centroa- 
mericanos. 
Es sabido de todos que hay fuerzas de inspiracion interna- 
cional que han venido conspirando para distanciar a los Gobier- 
nos del Istmc y para mantenerlos en estado de debilidad, con el 
objeto de hacerlos presa facil en sus planes de dominaci6n mun- 
dial. Por tai motivo, eJ Gobierno de El Salvador lamenta, como 
Vuestra Excelencia lo expresa, que esos "poderosos cfrculos in- 
.eresados en mantener desunidos a los Estados de la America 
Central, por una parte, y en impedir la revoluci6n democratica 
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cle Guatemala, por la otra", vean satisfecho y cumplido ese pri- 
mer interes apuntado por Vuestra Excelencia, con el paso atras 
que el Gobierno de Guatemala da en el camino de la unidad cen- 
troamericana, retirandose de la ODECA. En lo que a El Salva- 
dor concierne, no esta demas agregar que es tan grande su fer- 
vor unionista y su fe en la grandeza y en el futuro tie Centro 
America que ni su gobierno ni su pueblo conciben que haya 
circulos suficientemente capaces o poderosos para cambiar su 
ruta inequivoca de intcgraci<5n centroamericana. 
Es obvio que el Gobierno de Guatemala 86 ha dejado impre- 
sionar por una falsa propaganda destinada a crear dificultades 
en la America Central y a mantener desarticulados a los paises 
que la componen. Y es precisamente el repudio que su Gobierno 
hace a la ODECA el que viene a alejar aiin mas la realizaci6n de 
los objetivos de uni6n centroamericana, que no puede lograrse 
sin un entendimiento sincero y respetuoso entre los pueblos del 
Istmo. La historia seguramente eondenara la medida precipita- 
da del actual Gobierno de Guatemala y la senalara como un re- 
troceso en el creciente acercamiento de nuestros pueblos. 
El Gobierno de El Salvador, con plena conciencia de su res- 
ponsabilidad, declara que en ningun momento ha formado o pre- 
tendido formar bloques agresivos ni alianzas polfticas o milita- 
res contra Guatemala, y que jamas ha auspiciado movimientos 
de propaganda o de subversion en contra de esa hermana Repu- 
blica. El principio de no intervenci6n ha sido y es parte de la 
conciencia polftica salvadorena y ha sido escrupulosamente res- 
petado y mantenido por mi Gobierno. No cabe duda, sin embar- 
go, que hay en juego grandes intereses internacionales, a cuya 
propaganda tenaz y mal intencionada, se debe el hecho de que 
desde hace varios meses circulen las mas fantasticas especula- 
ciones sobre la politica centroamericana. 
Mientras esa propaganda no fue sino la expresi6n de indi- 
viduos o de grupos que viven de espaldas a los intereses de la 
nacionalidad centroamericana, no habia motivo de preocupaci6n, 
dado que toda obra y sobre todo las buenas obras, tienen la vir- 
tud de atraer despechos e iras. Lo grave del caso es que el Go- 
bierno de Guatemala se haya hecho eco de tales especies, sin es- 
clarecer previamente la situaci6n imperante, ya fuese a traves 
de las Cancillerias centroamericanas o recurriendo al mecanismo 
de la Organizacion de Estados Centroamericanos, instituido, 
conforme el Art. I de su Carta constitutiva, para "prevenir y 
conjurar toda desavenencia y asegurar la soluci6n pacifica de 
cualquier conflicto quo pudiera surgir" entre los Estados miem- 
bros. Dentro de la amifttad de nuestros pueblos y gobiernos lo 
natural hubiera sido aclatar los puntos dudosos, si es que los ha- 
bia, aetuando an armonia con los postulados centroamericanos. 
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No obstante, el Gobienio de Guatemala formula ante la Secre- 
taria General y el Consejo <le Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, 
graves acusaeiones en >ntra le las Rcpublicas de Honduras, Ni- 
caragua, Costa Rica, Panama y El Salvador, olvidando no s61o 
los preceptos de la Carta Organica de la ODECA, sino los com- 
promisos asumidos conforme a la Carta de la Organizaci6n de 
los Estados Americanos, suscrita por todas las Republicas del 
Continente, cuyo articulo 20 dispone que "todas las controver- 
sies que surjan entre los Estados americanos seran sometidas 
a los procedimientos senalados por la Carta, antes de ser eleva- 
dos al Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas". 
Alude la nota comentada a que las noticias periodisticas 
sobre una pretendida alianza militar contra Guatemala no fue- 
ron desmentidas ante el Gobierno de esa Republics ni ante sus 
Embajadores. Este es un argumento que no cabe dentro de la 
realidad de los acontecimientos. En efecto, en las declaraciones 
oficiales que la Cancilleria a mi cargo di*6 a la prensa —y que 
pueden verse reproducidas en el diario "Tribuna Libre" de San 
Salvador en sus ediciones del 10 y del 12 de febrero de 1953— el 
suscrito desminti6 de modo rotundo y categ6rico la versi6n que 
circul6 sobre un pretendido pacto politico-militar centroame- 
ricano, diciendo textualmente lo siguiente: "la Cancilleria sal- 
vadorena sigue una politica centroamericanista legal, sincera y 
definida. Por eso mismo, no se ocupa ni se ocupara jamas de 
formular acuerdos o hacer negociaciones secretas que en algu- 
na forma lesionen los intereses de alguno de los hermanos Raises 
del Istmo". 
Asi pues, la informaci6n dada por la prensa, sobre el pre- 
tendido pacto politico-militar, fue desmentida por mi Gobierno 
por ese mismo conducto. Como la noticia no provino de fuente 
oficial, mi Gobierno considerd innecesario desvanecerla. direc- 
tamente ante el de Guatemala. Tomando en cuenta que este no 
pidio aclaraciones al respecto, esta Cancilleria entendi6 que el 
Gobierno de Guatemala comprendia lo infundado de la especie. 
Resulta pues, extrano e il6gico que, despues de haber dejado 
pasar sin comentario una noticia carente, con toda evidencia, de 
veracidad, se le traiga a cuentas para justificar el retiro de Gua- 
temala de la Organizaci6n de Estados Centroamericanos. Es de 
sentir que Guatemala apoye en un rumor infundado una reso- 
lucion de tanta trascendencia para los altos intereses de la Ame- 
rica Central. 
Confirmando lo anterior, cabe agregar que el Gobierno de 
Costa Rica, por niedio del Excelentisimo senor Presidente don 
Otilio Ulate, desminti6 tambien en su oportunidad la noticia pe- 
riodistica sobre la alianza politico-militar. 
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El Gobierno de El Salvador no da a las noticias extraof icia- 
les ni a las declaraciones de ciudadanos que no desempefian fun- 
ciones publicas, la importancia que parece darles el Gobierno de 
Guatemala. Si la buena fe de los Gobiernos se mide por comen- 
tarios o noticias dudosas o mal intencionadas, no seria posible 
mantener la armonia internacional entre los paises que gozan de 
libertad de expresi6n. 
El Gobierno de Guatemala se queja de que la prensa de va- 
rios paises centroamericanos, inclusive El Salvador, le hace ata- 
ques que no responden a su verdadera situaci6n interna. Es la- 
mentable en grado sumo que los comentarios periodisticos no 
sean valorizados como manifestaciones de la libertad de opinion. 
El Gobierno salvadorefio jamas ha propiciado criticas contra el 
Gobierno de Guatemala, ni nunca un funcionario piiblico salva- 
dorefio le ha hecho ataques; actitud que no ha sido correspondi- 
da por funcionarios guatemaltecos. Los mismos 6rganos perio- 
disticos que ocasionalmente se refieren a los asuntos de Guate- 
mala, atacan cuando lo creen conveniente al Gobierno de El Sal- 
vador. 
Por otra parte, el Gobierno de Guatemala no tiene ningun 
derecho a quejarse de la actitud de la prensa salvadoreiia, por- 
que en su territorio se desarrollan violentos ataques contra el 
Gobierno de El Salvador y contra los demas Gobiernos centroa- 
mericanos. El Gobierno de El Salvador nunca ha reclamado al 
de Guatemala por la campaiia sistematica y pertinaz de calum- 
nias y descreditos que se realiza en su territorio por medio de 
discursos y organos de publicidad. El Gobierno de Guatemala, 
tolera, ademas, la propaganda antipatriotica que desarrollan sal- 
vadorefios entregados al imperialismo sovietico, quienes preten- 
den ser defensores de una libertad en que no creen y que sola- 
mente aprovechan para sus planes de desintegraci6n nacional. 
El Gobierno salvadorefio, conocedor de esos hechos, no ha pro- 
testado por ellos estimando, por una parte, que el Gobierno de 
Guatemala no participa en ellos, y por otra que, cuando hay li- 
bertad de expresi6n, esa propaganda no puede ser restringida 
sino dentro de las vias legales. La actitud del Gobierno de Gua- 
temala ante la libertad de expresi6n es la que mantiene mi Go- 
bierno ante los peri6dicos salvadorenos. Es raro que ese Gobier- 
no se queje de algo que en su territorio existe y se respeta tan- 
to como en El Salvador. * 
Este punto, sefialado en la nota del 4 de abril, carece de fun- 
damentb y no justifica el retiro de la ODECA, ni prueba que El 
Salvador participe en una conspiracion contra Guatemala. 
El Gobierno de ese pueblo hermano toma como indice de los 
pretendidos manejos salvadorefios, el hecho de que varias mi- 
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siones civiles y militarcs do dlvwsoa psisM centroamericanoa 
se hayan hecho visita.s dontnto los ultin. i meses. Aun haciendo 
un esfuerzo para deducir de esas visitas lo que pretende la nota 
de la Cancilleria guatemalteca, no ae llega sino a confirmar que 
cuando hay suspicacias, se desvirtiia el recto y natural sentido 
de los acontecimientos. Intercambios de ese tipo, segun la nota 
aludida, contrarian el criterio de unanimidad que prescribe la 
Carta constitutiva de la ODECA. 
Dicha Carta, ni explicita ni implicitamente restringe los 
contactos entre funcionarios centroamericanos. Antes bien, su 
espiritu propicia el mayor entendimiento y cordialidad entre los 
organismos oficiales. Es imposible pretender, por su falta de 
yiabilidad que toda visita a un pais se haga por misiones con- 
juntas del resto de los Estados. Pero si en alguna forma se hu- 
biese tornado ese acuerdo, el Gobierno salvadoreno lo hubiera 
cumplido, advirtiendo que, a su juicio, nunca la desconfianza 
ha sido constructiva. 
Por otra parte, misiones guatemaltecas y salvadorenas, mi- 
litares y civiles, han contribuido en los ultimos tiempos a la me- 
jor comprension entre nuestros dos Gobiernos, sin que dichosa- 
mente la falta de funcionarios de los otros paises en esas entre* 
vistas, provocase sospechas o malos entendimientos. Es inacep- 
table, pues, que a una forma de estrechar vinculos, usada por el 
Gobierno de Guatemala, venga este a darle, repentinamente, el 
caracter de signo de confabuIaci6n agresiva. Es por ello que el 
Gobierno salvadoreno rechaza energicamente los alcances que la 
nota aludida atribuye a esas visitas. 
La ponencia anticomunista que el Gobierno de El Salvador 
present6 a la consideraci6n de los Gobiernos Centroamericanos, 
para que se incluyera como tema de discusi6n en la proyectada 
Conferencia de Cancilleres, es asunto que merece estudiarse des- 
de sus origenes. 
El Gobierno de El Salvador estima que la doctrina y acci6n 
del comunismo internacional son una amenaza efectiva en con- 
tra de los pueblos libres del mundo y de los principios basicos de 
toda organizaci6n democratica. Tambi6n ha creido mi Gobierno 
que una de las mas caras aspiraciones de los pueblos es la reali- 
zacidn de la justicia social, sin la que es imposible en esta epoca 
hist6rica, conseguir el progreso verdadero ni la verdadera paz. 
La doctrina comunista y la actividad internacional del imperia- 
lismo sovietico que predican la dictadura, el despotismo politico 
y el odio de clases, constituyen, a juicio del Gobierno salvadore- 
no. los mayores obstaculos para la democracia, la justicia social 
y el desarollo econ6mico. Es por ello que mi Gobierno se ha tra- 
zado, en su politica interna, una linea de defensa -ibsoluta ante 
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el comunismo mternacional. Al Gobierno salvadoreno no le inte- 
resa, sin embargo, la forma en que cada pafs resuelva sus pro- 
rii!00 S,yr?faicf' Si hay ° no h»y comunismo en otro pais y si el Gobierno de ese pais lo ve con benevolencia o 
antipatia, es cosa que a nosotros no nos concierne. Lo que mi 
Uobierno desea es que esas actividades no invadan su territo- 
no y asf como respeta a sus vecinos, reclama que se le respete. 
El Gobierno de Guatemala conoce y recuerda sobre este parti- 
cular los ocursos diplomatics que mi Gobierno le ha presentado 
generalmente por via verbal, con objeto de poner un valladar a 
la infiltraci6n que por medio de agentes y propaganda comunis- 
tas se ha venido efectuando a traves de nuestra frontera. 
El Salvador ha sufrido constantemente la presi6n de activi- 
dades subversivas ejercidas por agentes comunistas internacio- 
nales, y, dado que aun aceptando la buena voluntad del Gobier- 
no de Guatemala para poner fin a esa penetraci6n a travel de la 
frontera, no fu<§ posible lograr ningun £xito, el Gobierno salva- 
doreno pens6 en un medio para buscar soluci6n adecuada a la 
importance y magnitud del problema. Asf, ante aquella amena 
za que parecfa no ceder nunca, sino volverse mas y mds grave, 
?fPen56 en "tilizar los medios de cooperaci6n que ofrece la 
ODECA, para llegar a un acuerdo destinado a impedir la infil- 
traci6n del comunismo. La actitud salvadoreiia nunca tuvo por 
objeto el comunismo o el anticomunismo en el interior de Gua- 
temala, sino un convenio que llevase seguridad y tranquilidad 
mutuas a los vecinos centroamericanos. 
El Gobierno salvadoreno no present6 el punto intempesti- 
vamente, sino que por medio de notas estrictamente confiden- 
ciales, lo di6 a conocer a los Gobiernos centroamericanos, hacien- 
do constar que seria presentado a la Reuni6n de Cancilleres, si 
aquellos daban su asentimiento previo. 
... Deaafortunadamente. y no obstante el car^cter muy con- 
fidencial de tal docuinento, su contenido trascendi6 en Guate- 
mala al conocimiento publico, tuvo amplia difusi6n y provoc6 
(lversos comentarios y ataques al Gobierno de El Salvador Es 
de consignarse tambien que algun tiempo despues, el Canciller 
Galich, signatario de la Carta de San Salvador, renunciaba de 
8U cargo de Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Guatemala, 
haciendo en su dimisi6n ataques infundados en contra de los 
Gobiernos que hasta el mismo dia le habian tendido su mano 
amiga. A raiz de la publicaci6n de la propuesta salvadoreiia los 
agentes del imperialism© sovidtico recrudecieron su campana 
contra la causa unionista y contra todo lo que significa un cri- 
teno mdependiente y un sentido de nacionalidad centroamerica- 
na. En estas condiciones, el Gobierno de mi pafs, sin el mfnimo 
deseo de causar molestias al de Vuestra Excelencia, no podfa 
— 36 — 
ya eerier en su posici6n. Asi, cuando el Gobierno de Guatemala 
planted al de El Salvador la posibilidad de que este retirara o 
modificara sustancialmente su ponencia anticomunista, la res- 
puesta fue negativa, fundada en principios de independencia y 
dignidad nacional. 
Es mas, al presentar su propuesta anticomunista, mi Go- 
bierno trataba de reafirmar en las relaciones centroamericanas 
los principios, declaraciones y recomendaciones contenidos en 
documentos interamericanos suscritos por El Salvador, lo mis- 
mo que por Guatemala y demas paises de Centro America y de 
este Hemisferio, en los que se condena explicitamente la acci6n 
nociva del comunismo internacional, dirigida contra cualquiera 
de las Republicas de America, con objeto de que tal actitud pueda 
ser prevenida y sancionada. Entre esos documentos se encuen- 
tran la Resoluci6n VI de la Segunda Reuni6n de Consulta de los 
Cancilleres Americanos, celebrada en La Habana en 1940; la Re- 
soluci6n XXXII de la Novena Conferencia Internacional Ameri- 
cana, suscrita en Bogota en 1948; y las Resoluciones I y VIII sus- 
critas en la Cuarta Reuni6n de Consulta de Ministros de Relacio- 
nes Exteriores, que tuvo lugar en Washington en Abril de 1951, 
y a las cuales el actual Gobierno de Guatemala di6 su asentimien- 
to y aprobaci6n sin reservas de ninguna clase. 
Al hacer mencion de tales documentos interamericanos, no 
me mueve otro prop6sito que el de hacer notar que, por haberlos 
suscrito el Gobierno de Guatemela, al igual que el Gobierno de El 
Salvador y los del resto de Centro America, no podia juzgarse 
improcedente el hecho de que mi Gobierno propusiera la inclusion 
del punto relativo a contrarrestar la acci6n subversiva del comu- 
nismo internacional, en el programa de la Reuni6n de Cancilleres 
Centroamericanos que debia de realizarse en Guatemala. 
No pudo inmaginarse mi Gobierno que siendo la acci6n del 
comunismo internacional, como lo han declarado reiteradamente 
las Republicas Americanas, de caracter netamente intervencio- 
nista, pudiera interpretarse que tiene ese mismo caracter la ac- 
titud defensiva encaminada a contrarrestar las actividades del 
mismo. 
Es lamentable que ideales de tan alta estirpe, como son los que 
tienden a la unidad y grandeza de Centro America, se vean 
menospreciados con facilidad, y mas lamentable todavia que la 
desconfianza haya enturbiado el ambiente del Istmo. Al Gobierno 
de Guatemala le cabe la responsabilidad his^6rica de haberse he- 
cho eco de esas maniobres divisionistas. 
La nota guatemalteca constituye una agresion moral contra 
un pueblo amigo, desde luego que   indocumentadamente le atri- 
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buye cargos que pretenden desconocer   su neutralidad y la r 
tud de su politica. 
Es de esperar que   el Gobierno de Guatemala   comr   a   a v 
reconozca la verdadera actitud del Gobierno de 21 Si'   ' 
de los demas Gobiernos Centroamericanos. El Gobierno ■■■   'ido- 
refio excita muy cordialmente al Gobierno de Guatf   - '    >     I es- 
clarecer los malos entendimientos y para que retor e c do 
la familia centroamericana, reintegrandose a la ODE* 
Valgome de esta oportunidad para reiterar 6 "\es ra Ex- 
celencia las seguridades de mi mas alta y distingu.' •• congide- 
racion. 
R(    KRTO E. CANESSA, 
Ministrc  de Relaciones Exteriores. 
Excmo. Senor Lie. don Raul Osegueda 
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 
Guatemala. 
NOTA: El texto de la  anterior   carta, fue   redactado   por una   Comision 
pr-sidida por el Sefior Presidente Oscar Osorio. 
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Los Gobiernos de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras y Ni- 
caragua, 
CONSIDERANDO: 
Que el Gobierno de la Repiiblica de Guatemala ha denuncia- 
do la Carta de San Salvador, constitutiva de la Organizaci6n de 
Estados Centroamericanos; 
Que los restantes Gobiernos Centroamericanos mantienen 
la mas firme e inquebrantable adhesi6n a los principios de la re- 
ferida Carta y el deseo de lograr la consecucidn de sus prop6si- 
tos; 
Que la decisi6n del Gobierno de Guatemala situa a los refe- 
ridos Gobiernos en la necesidad de adoptar un nuevo pronuhcia- 
miento sobre su determinacidn de continuar unidos dentro de la 
Organizaci6n de Estados Centroamericanos, 
ACUERDAN: 
1<?—Considerar vigente entre las Republicas de Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Honduras y Nicaragua, la Carta de San Salvador 
constitutiva de la Organizaci6n de Estados Centroamericanos. 
2"—Excitar al Gobierno de Guatemala, por conducto del de 
Costa Rica, a que reconsidere su denuncia de la Carta de San Sal- 
vador, y reingrese a la Organizaci6n de Estados Centroameri- 
canos . 
3?—Fijar el plazo de seis meses a contar de esta fecha para 
que dentro de el se convoque a la prfixima Reuni6n ordinaria de 
Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores por el Gobierno de Nicara- 
gua, a cuyo pais corresponde la sede de conformidad con el or- 
den rotativo que establece el Articulo 8' de la Carta de San Sal- 
vador. 
40—Comisionar al Gobierno de Costa Rica para conservar 
el original del present* Acuerdo, librando copias certificadas a 
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los Ministerios de Relaciones de los paises signatarios, y para 
efectuar su registro en la Secretarfa General de las Naciones 
Unidas conforme el Articulo 102 de su carta. 
5?_Denominar el presente Acuerdo "ACUERDO DE SAN 
JOSE". 
En fe de lo cual, los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras y Nicaragua, firman este do- 
cuments en la ciudad de San Jose, a los dieciseis dias del mes de 
abril de mil novecientos cincuenta y tres. 
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San Salvador x'J de Julio do 1953. 
LA REUNION EXTRAORDINARIA DE MINISTROS DE RE- 
LACIONES EXTEUIORES  CENTROAMERICANOS, 
CONSIDERANDO: 
V>—Que en la "Declaraci6n de San Jose" de 16 de Abril de 
1953 se acordo que en esta Reunion Extraordinaria se ad6ptarian 
las modificaciones de la Carta de San Salvador que se estimaran 
convenientes en vista del retiro de Guatemala como miembro de 
la Organizaci6n; 
2?—Que fue la intenci6n de los Estados signatarios de di- 
cha Carta fundar un Organismo Regional capaz de utilizar los 
elementos de una cultura y una historia comunes a los pueblos 
del Istmo y de estimular los vinculos fraternales que los unen, 
para cooperar en el ambito Centroamericano al desarrollo del 
sentimiento de solidaridad humana bajo normas de justicia y de 
respeto a los postulados del Derecho Internacional que procuran 
las Naciones Unidas y la Organizaci6n de los Estados America- 
nos; 
3'—Que ninguna disposici6n de dicha Carta crea para los 
Estados signatarios obligaciones o derechos que no les hubieran 
sido ya atribuidos por las Cartas de San Francisco y Bogota, y 
que puedan ser afectados por el simple hecho del retiro de uno 
o mas de esos Estados del seno de la Organization; 
4?—Que la misma Declaraci6n de San Jose ya declar6 que 
la Carta de San Salvador continua vigente entre Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Honduras y Nicaragua; 
5V—Que despues de haberse estudiado com amplitud la si- 
tuaci6n existente se ha llegado a la conclusion de que el retiro 
de Guatemala no ha producido ni puede producir modificaciones 
en los principios que sustenta la vida de este Organismo Regio- 
nal ni en los propositos que el mismo persigue, por lo cual no es 
necesario modificar la Carta de San Salvador; y en cuanto al 
nombre de Guatemala que figura en ella debe entenderse auto- 
maticamente eliminado por el retiro de ese pais, el cual podra, 
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cuando lo estime oportuno, reingresar a la ODECA como miem- 
bro que fue de ella; 
RESUELVE: 
19—Que no es procedente haccr cambio alguno en la estruc- 
tura juridica de la Carta de San Salvador. 
29—Que Guatemala  podra  reingresar a  la  Organization, 
cuando lo estime conveniente. 
La Reuni6n Extraordinaria de Ministros de Relaciones Exterio- 
res Centroamericanos, 
CONSIDER ANDO: 
Que los pafses miembros de la ODECA fundan sus institu- 
ciones en los principios democraticos del derecho soberano de los 
pueblos a gobernarse por si mismos y del respeto a los derechos y 
libertados del hombre; 
Que las actividades del comunismo jnternacional tienden a 
subvertir esas instituciones mediante la esclavizaci6n de los pue- 
blos y de los individuos; 
Que de conformidad con el Articulo 1? de la Carta de la Or- 
ganizaci6n de Estados Centroamericanos, es deber de la Organi- 
zaci6n buscar solution conjunta a sus problemas comunes me- 
diante la acci6n cooperativa y solidaria; 
Que las Repiiblicas integrantes de la Organizaci6n de Es- 
tados Centroamericanos, conscientes de la unidad de sus propo- 
sitos de defender y preservar las instituciones democraticas fun- 
damentals de sus pueblos, son signatarias de la Resolution VI 
de la Segunda Reunion de Cancilleres celebrada en La Habana, 
Cuba; de la Declaration de Mexico de la Confederacidn de Cha- 
pultepec; de la Resoluci6n XXXII de la Novena Conferencia In- 
ternational Americana, celebrada en Bogota, Colombia, y de la 
Declaraci6n de Washington y la Resoluci6n VIII de la Cuarta 
Reuni6n de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, ce- 
lebrada en Washington, Estados Unidos de America; 
Que es de urgencia para la tranquilidad de sus pueblos, jus- 
tamente alarmados por las actividades de los agentes del comu- 
nismo internacional, reafirmar los prop6sitos planteados en 
aquellas reuniones internacionales, adoptar medidas conjuntas 
de defensa y hacerlas efectivas mediante una action solidaria, 
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RESUELVE: 
PRIMERO: Reafirmar los principios democraticos como ba- 
se fundamental de las Instituciones de los pafses de Centroame 
rica. 
SEGUNDO: Reconocer la necesidad de mejorar las condi- 
ciones sociales, econ6micas y culturales de sus pueblcs, come e" 
medio mas eficaz para fortalecer sus instituciones democraticas. 
TERCERO: Reiterar la condenacion del comunismo inter- 
nacional que tiende a suprimir los derechos y libertades politi- 
cos y civiles. 
CUARTO: Recomendar a sus Gobiernos que adopten den- 
tro de sus respectivos territories y de conformidad con sus pre- 
ceptos constitucionales, medidas conducentes a prevenir, con- 
trarrestar y sancionar las actividades subversivas de los agentcs 
comunistas, y especialmente las encaminadas a: 
a) Impedir el uso indebido de documentos de viaje; 
b) Impedir la difusi6n y circulacion de propaganda subver- 
siva; 
c) Prohibir la exportaci6n de materiales estrategicos a paf- 
ses dominados por gobiernos comunistas; j 
d) Suministrarse  reciprocamente  toda  informaci6n  sobre 
las actividades que desarrollen los agentes comunistas. 
QUINTO: Recomendar asimismo a los Gobiernos de los pai- 
ses miembros de la ODECA que se comuniquen las medidas que 
adopten en cumplimiento de esta Resoluci6n, que los Ministros 
encargados se cunsulten sobre estas materias, y si los Gobier- 
nos lo estiman conveniente, se reiinan de conformidad con el 
Articulo 49 de la Carta Constitutiva de la Organizacion. 
SEXTO: Este documento sera conocido como "RESOLUCION 
DE MANAGUA". 
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